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Can Resource Mobilization Predict the Level of Success Among Social Movement
Organizations?
Kathryn Brannan
Illinois Wesleyan University
Honors Research Seminar Spring 2009
Advisor: Greg Shaw

Abstract: This paper is a series of case studies of social movement organizations within
the AIDS Awareness Movement of the 1 980s. By examining ACT UP, the Names
Project, and Gay Men's Health Crisis, we see that resource mobilization theory can help
explain varying levels of success among SMOs that worked in the same context and
within the same subculture. Internal organization, networking, innovation and the use of
violence are all strategies which are found to be significant in explaining the success of
each SMO. This paper shows the predictive ability of resource mobilization theory. It
closes with suggestions for future work, including a new measure of success of SMOs.

Introduction

Social movements are deliberate patterns of contentious actions committed by
groups whose members are working toward the same broadly defined goal. Actors use
contentious action when other options (i.e. voting, petition signing, etc.) are not open to
them or have failed. Multiple uses of contentious actions for an express purpose
constitute a social movement: "We have social movement dynamics going on when
single episodes of collective action are perceived as components of a longer-lasting
action, rather than discrete events; and when those who are engaged in them feel linked
by ties of solidarity and of ideal communion with protagonists of other analogous
mobilizations" (Diani and Della Porta 2006, 23).
Social movements emerge when a conflict occurs which a certain group wants to
have solved outside of the institution. "For a protest to emerge, activists must believe
that an opportunity exists, that they have the power to bring about change; and they must
blame the system for the problem" (Diani and Della Porta 2006, 1 8). Once movements
emerge, they are dynamic; they change over time to meet challenges of an uncontrollable
political context. Movements are also cyclical, making it difficult to determine when
they have begun and when (or if) they have ended. The dynamic, cyclical nature of
protest makes analysis of a movement's success difficult.
There are two prominent theories to explain the success of social movements.
The first, new movement theory explains social movement organizations (SMOs) based
on subcultures that form out of the movement. "Activists in the community develop a
shared vocabulary that extends well beyond particular political issues; it includes ways of
socializing, styles of dress and presentation of self, and often unarticulated, but shared,
beliefs in a range of issues (Meyer and Whittier 1 994; Taylor and Whittier 1 992; Whittier
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1 995)" (Meyer 2007, 52). This subculture keeps participants connected to the movement
and encourages them to stay active. Also, the subculture spreads through society to
others who become interested in the movement. In this 'way, the subculture draws in new
members who bring donations or other resources to support the cause. New movement
theory says that the development of a subculture, which keeps participants connected,
while drawing in new supporters, is crucial to the success of a movement (see McAdam
et al. 200 1 , Tilly 2004).
The second main theory in social movement literature is resource mobilization
theory, first introduced by John D. McCarthy. This theory states that the political context
in which a group acts, the resources available to the group, and how the group uses its
resources all affect the success of the group. "In this view, social movements have no
distinct imler logic and are not fundamentally different from institutionalized behavior.
Organizations, institutions, pre-existing communication networks, and rational actors are
all seen as important resources playing crucial roles in the emergence and outcome of
collective action . . . organizational and institutional structures are argued to be central
throughout the entire process of collective action" (Morris 1 997, 9 1 ) . If a group is able to
.

act during a window of political opportunity, or perhaps create a favorable political
environment; is able to obtain needed resources; and is able to use those resources in a
positive way, that group will have the highest chance of success.
Out of these two prominent theories, this paper will use resource mobilization
theory. This paper will test resource mobilization theory to determine if this model is
useful in explaining varying success levels. Also, resource mobilization focuses more on
the role of political behaviors. "Resource mobilization theory is based in a strategic
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approach to the study of social movements; it emphasizes the mobilization and allocation
of resources by social movement actors in the context of opportunities and constraints
imposed by the social and political environment. Pa�icular attention focuses on the role
of formal social movement organizations as the key social actors planning strategies and
mobilizing resources" (Mueller 1 994, 1 58). New movement theory has been critiqued for
its lack of attention to institutionalized aspects of social movements: "Critics of new
movement theory contend that this approach does not adequately explain the formalized
dimensions of movement organizations or their internal structures. New movement
theorists have also been criticized for overstating the cultural aspects of new movements
while underestimating the linkages between movements and more institutionally oriented
political behavior" (Halc1i 1 999, 1 37).
The use of resource mobilization theory will be beneficial in this paper because it
explains success levels of groups acting within the same subculture. Both subculture and
context are controlled for here to determine if the use of resources is able to explain
success levels. Also, the theory's focus on interactions between SMOs and government
institutions is important for the study of politics. By selecting this theory to explain
social movement success, this paper will also take into consideration the critiques of
resource mobilization theory. The most common criticism is as follows: "This theory has
been criticized for overlooking the informal and noninstitutional or even anti-institutional
dimensions of social movement activity. It does not adequately address the cultural,
expressive, and identity-building elements central to 'many social movement
organizations" (Halc1i 1 999, 1 36). However, because these SMOs were working within
the sane subcultures and contexts, this critique is partially taken into account.
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Using resource mobilization theory, this paper will work to explain the success of
three social movement organizations within the AIDS awareness movement. Each
organization's resources will be compared to show why some of these organizations were
successful while others failed while working for the same general goals in the same
political context and within the same subculture. These SMOs will be used in a series of
case studies to show that resource mobilization theory can be used to explain varying
degrees of success of different groups. The goal here is to explain how and why social
movement organizations differ and what impact those differences have on the degree of
success the SMO experiences.

Literature Review

New movement theory proposes that a social movement organization (SMO) can
be successful ifit builds a subculture, allowing its members to create new identities based
on the movement's ideals. Resource mobilization theory focuses instead on the resources
which a group has and the political context which a group is acting in as variables which
explain an SMO's success. This view of social movement success will be used because
of its focus on political institutions and their importance in social movements. It is also
useful because these groups shared a similar subculture.
Resource mobilization theory says that "characteristics, resources, and strategies
of social movement organizations" along with outside political context, determine the
success of the SMO (Jasper and Poulsen 1 993, 397). Charles Tilly advances the notion
that resources and the tactics that groups utilize are significant; this "significance of
tactics to social movements derives from the unenviable position in which excluded or
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challenging groups find themselves" (McAdam 1 997, 340). Although groups are
excluded from traditional avenues of protest, they still organize institutionally. This
shows the relationship between SMOs and political organizations. Ultimately, although
outside context is an important variable to explain success, "organizational and
institutional structures are argued to be central throughout the entire process of collective
action" (Morris 1 997, 9 1 ).
This theory, along which has been updated since it was originally presented by
McCarthy and Zald, shows that groups can be successful when they have many resources
available and when political opportunities that exist are more powerful than potential
threats to the SMO. But what if an SMO plans to act and wishes to know its chance of
success? It certainly cannot control the political environment or context in which it wants
to act. The group could wait for a time when political opportunities seem to exist, but
·
groups may feel the need to act without delay. The question this paper seeks to examine
is can an SMO control its ability to succeed in its movement? This paper will control for
political context while variables related to resources will be the main focus. By using the
best resources available to them, SMOs will be moderately successful in meeting their
goals. They will have more success when they use these resources in a positive political
context, though some success is still possible in a negative context. Now I will examine
resources and their uses based on past literature.
Leadership

The type and quality of leadership plays a role in the success of an SMO.
According to Staggenborg, there are three types of leaders: professional managers who
are paid for their work, nonprofessional staff leaders who are sometimes paid for their
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work, and nonprofessional volunteers who are not paid at all. A professional leader is
best because this type of leader typically will set up formal internal organization
structures, which ultimately benefit the group. The ability of a group to pay workers has
allows them to attract these professional organizers. They may or may not be as
dedicated to the cause, but "professionalization and formalization importantly affect the
structure and maintenance of social movement organizations, their strategies and tactics,
and their participation in coalition work" (Staggenborg 1 997, 42 1 ).
Piven and Cloward are skeptical of the benefits of professional leaders: "far from
inspiring people to action, organizational leaders can deprive them of their major power
the power to disrupt" (quoted in Tarrow 1 998, 1 23). However, McCarthy'and Zald
( 1 977) focused on the importance of professionalization in their resource mobilization
theory, which cemented the positive view of professional leaders. While professional
leaders may stifle some spontaneous disruptive action, they are beneficial because they
know how to gain support: "They are able to do so because they have organizational
structures and professional staff that facilitate the mobilization of resources"
(Staggenborg 1 997, 43 1 ). While there are costs of professionaliz ation, the benefits (the
ability to organize and mobilize support) seem to outweigh them to show that ultimately
professional leaders benefit SMOs.
Internal Organization

Staggenborg divides SMOs into two categories of internal organization:
formal/structured organization and informal organization. These distinctions are
important because "[f]ormalization does affect the strategic and tactical choices of SMOs.
First, formalized SMOs tend to engage in institutionalized tactics and typically do not
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initiate disruptive tactics. Second, fonnalized SMOs are more likely than infonnal SMOs
to engage in activities that help to achieve organizational maintenance and expansion as
well as influence on external targets" (Staggenborg 1 997, 423). Fonnalized SMOs are
usually set up by professional leaders. They have set procedures for action which is a
benefit because they are "prepared to take advantage of opportunities for mobilization
when the environment changes" (Staggenborg 1 997, 43 1 ). Fonnally organiz�d SMOs are
. beneficial because "a strong, stable, and well-resourced organization is in a better
position to bargain with people in the government" (Meyer 2007, 3 6). Throughout the
protest cycle, as public opinion changes, fonnally organized SMOs are more likely to use
the environment to their favor because they are more prepared to do so; these groups are
"geared toward organizational maintenance and expansion" activities such as fundraising
and lobbying (Staggenborg 1 997, 433). Fonnalized groups are better apt to organize
activities and to maintain themselves during all periods of the movement. This makes
them more likely to bring success than infonnally organized groups, which are successful
only during peaks of protest cycles.
In modem social movements, a "pattern of social movement organization seems
to be appearing: a combination of small professional leaderships; large but mainly
passive support; and impersonal networklike connective structures" (Tarrow et al. 1 998"
1 33). Though movements have this tendency, they must be careful to maintain both
professional leadership and active members; "The problem for movement organizers is to
create organizational models that are sufficiently robust to structure sustained relations
with opponents, but are flexible enough to pennit the infonnal connections that link
people and networks to one another to aggregate and coordinate contention" (Tarrow et
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al. 1 998, 1 24). If professional leaders are still able to be somewhat flexible, they will
benefit from a strong organization which can better maintain the organization without
stifling the movement, as Piven and Cloward feared.
Networking

Groups within SMOs need to communicate and work together when possible. By
coordinating activity, groups can involve more people in acts of contention, thus
generating more interest and publicity. According to Tarrow, modem organizations have
been experiencing a problem mobilizing. "The problem is for movement organizers to
create organizational models that are sufficiently robust to structure sustained relations
with opponents, but are flexible enough to permit the informal connections that link
people and networks to one another to aggregate and coordinate contention" (Tarrow et
al. 1 998, 1 24). Organizations (formal or informal) that are flexible allow members to
stay connected throughout the protest cycle. If SMOs could "draw on existing social
networks, they could mobilize supporters rapidly and put pressure on the state through
established institutions" (Tarrow et al. 1 998, 1 29). This is similar to the idea in new
movement theory that creating a large, well-connected group allows the SMO to organize
more rapidly. Flexibility in organizational structure allows for networking, which can
bring multiple groups' resources together for a large-scale act of contention.
If groups are able to network, not only can they work with like-minded groups;
they can also share ideas with people outside of the movement. "Pre-existing social
structures provide the resources and organizations that are crucial to the initiation and
spread of collective action" (Morris 1 997, 9 1 ). Networks allow groups to spread their
collective identity and culture, encouraging outsiders to "experiment with alternative
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lifestyles" which movement supporters often adopt (Diani and Della Porta 2006, 1 3 1 ).
SMOs which engage in networking are more likely to be successful because they can
draw on networks for mobilization and can use them to spread their ideas in society.
Innovation

If an SMO is able to create a new type of protest or new tactics to use in
contentious action, they can be more successful. According to Tilly, the "actual range of
tactics that social movements in America have embraced remains relatively narrow",
confined to sit-ins, marches, and other common tactics (Meyer 2007, 1 00). But some
tactics can be innovative and new, either for the movement or for social movements in
total. "A tactic sends a message to authorities about a group's commitment, size, claims,
and potential to disrupt. A tactic also sends a message to activists about the same things.
And a tactic sends a message to bystanders about a group's concerns, intentions, and
worthiness. In every case, activists hope and plan for responses; concessions or
repressions from authorities; intensified commitment from activists; and support from
bystanders, either by joining in the struggle directly or by pressuring authorities to
respond to activists" (Meyer 2007, 87).
"The significance of tactics to social movements derives from the unenviable
position in which excluded or challenging groups find themselves. According to Gamson
( 1 975 : 1 40): 'the central difference among political actors is captured by the idea of being
inside or outside of the polity . . . Those who are outside are challengers. They lack the
basic prerogative of members- routine access to decisions that affect them.' The key
challenge confronting insurgents, then, is to devise some way to overcome the basic
powerlessness that has confined them to a position of institutionalized political
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impotence. The solution to this problem is preeminently tactical" (McAdam 1 997, 340).
The movement can use "negative inducements or disruptive tactics" but then "must be
able to sustain the leverage it has achieved through the use of such tactics" (McAdam
1 997, 340). Organizations must be ready to use new tactics when political opportunity
arises. Once a new tactic is used, movement activity will peak. In his study of the civil
rights movement, McAdam shows that the "number of actions is highest immediately
following the introduction of a new technique" (McAdam 1 997, 343). This shows that
pace is a function of innovation. Innovation adds to potential for success by creating
peaks in movement activIty.
Use of Violence

Social movement liter
.
protest; some scholars say violence hurts the movement, while others see a benefit.
Violence in this case includes illegal actions, arrests, and violence on the part of either
protesters or outsiders such as police. More than 25% of SMOs have used violence
(Gamson 1 997). A commonly held view is that violence is "self-defeating. Evaluating
the validity of this belief is made elusive by a tendency that we all have, social scientists
and laymen alike, to allow our moral judgments to influence our strategic judgments and
vice versa" (Gamson 1 997, 3 5 7). This opinion stems from "both moral views of violence
and the vision of a pluralist American society in which violence is not necessary for
success" (Gamson 1 997, 3 57). Putting aside these views, though, Gamson shows that
violence users are more successful. His empi� cal findings (discussed below) support the
ideas advanced by Piven and Cloward.
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Groups who are considered violence users must be active participants "in the
violent interactions in which it is involved" (Gamson 1 997, 359). They can be either
initiators or recipients who then participate in violence. Violence users who were
arrested gained new advantages after the violent incident. Groups with limited goals who
used violence had an advantage over non-violent groups with similar goals. Also, groups
who used social constraints or "unruly" behavior experienced gains; these gains were less
significant than violence users but more significant than non-violent groups. Based on
these findings, violence will be viewed as "an instrumental act, aimed at furthering the
purposes of the groups that uses it" (Gamson 1 997, 3 6 1 ). The use of violence or unruly
behavior will be an independent variable explaining success.
Political Context

ThrougQ.out a movement, the political context in which a group acts can change;
"a conflict is likely to change profoundly as it becomes political" (Schattschneider 1 975,
3 6). Groups hope to use their resources to improve the context and the public perception
of their movement; context can also change the other way, making it more difficult for
the movement to succeed. In either case, context, like the social movement, is dynamic;
"Private conflicts are taken into the public arena precisely because someone wants to
make certain that the power ratio among the private interests most immediately involved
shall not prevail" (Schattschneider 1 975, 37). The political atmosphere when a group
first forms is based on public support. This can be measured by public opinion, monetary
donations received, and the number of active participants a group has. Change in the
initial context can be seen best in the reaction of the targets which the SMOs protest.
"[T]he outcomes of protest campaigns are often influenced by the actions of the
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organizations under attack: their preexisting vulnerabilities (Walsh, 1 986), their strategic
responses to protest, especially damaging 'blunders,' and their ability to mobilize a
countermovement" (Jasper and Poulsen 1 993, 397). The way targets react and their
ability to mobilize a countermovement shows the strength of the opposition to the
movement. Public opinion and the reactions of targets that form countermovements
demonstrate the relationship between protestors and outside groups. These outside
groups affect the political context in which a SMO can act, in tum affecting how the
SMO acts and the success level of those actions.
Together each of these resources will be used to explain the success of the SMOs
to be studied. The theory draws on research mobilization theory and some improvements
or additions of variables made to it. However, this paper will control for context by
examining the same movement and group action in the same period of time; in this way
this paper will focus on variables within a group's control can affect success. Also,
subculture is controlled for because each of the SMOs studied shared a similar subculture
that existed among gay men. Variables solely within a groups' control are not yet
discussed in the literature but could provide an interesting insight for group members and
leaders who wish to begin or participate in social movements. If these people wish to act,
must they wait for a window of opportunity in the political world? If they do not, can
they still be successful?

Hypothesis

This paper will examine three prominent groups within the AIDS Awareness
movement to show that resource mobilization theory is useful in explaining the success
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of each group. Three groups which represent a wide range of tactics utilized in the
movement will be compared in this case study. This does leave out many other groups
who were involved in the AIDS Awareness movement, but it will allow multiple groups
and tactics to be presented rather than just one due to the time consuming nature of the
research. Also, each group in this study shares a similar subculture because each group
consisted of primarily gay men who had interacted previously in the gay rights
movement.
This case study will differ slightly from resource mobilization theory in that it
will put less of an emphasis on the context in which groups act. This is an important
variable in the theory but it will be controlled for to focus more on the resources a group
has and the ways they use these resources. Context will be controlled for by studying the
same social movement (the AIDS Awareness movement) in the same time period (1 9821 995). While acknowledging the political context in which each SMO worked during the
AIDS Awareness movement, this paper will look to see if the use of resources has an
impact on the level of success a group can experience or if success is predetermined by
context. Future groups can then use this knowledge to either wait to act until the political
:
context is favorable or to act no matter what political context exists at the group's
inception. Groups usually act regardless of political context; although the context can
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have a significant impact on their actions and strategic planning, a negative context will
not stop groups from acting. This paper will show future groups what level of success
they can expect based on the way they use their resources.
The data will show that while controlling for context and subculture, resources
and how they are used have an impact on success. Furthermore, if a group has resources
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and uses them in a positive way they will achieve a higher level of success than other
groups in the same movement who do not utilize their resources efficiently. Finally, the
data will show a need for future research in measuring SMO success.

Data and Methods

The data for this paper will be taken from various sources, both first-person
accounts, as well as viewpoints of outside observers and scholars. Each movement was
researched extensiv�ly. Each movement has a website with first-person sources as well
as some original documents.
Besides website information, journal articles on the groups and the movements as
a whole will be used. These will give some first person accounts of being involved in
movement activities. Mostly, though, they will be outside analyses of the group in the
context of the larger movement. These will help to analyze specific contentious actions
and their relation to the movement as a whole. They will also be helpful to gain
information about how the group functions and uses its resources. These journal articles
will be most helpful in assessing how the group works and what it was able to do in the
context of the movement.
Where available, data from newspapers and magazines was used as sources. This
was beneficial because it gives an outside perspective of the movement and the group in
question. This data can be used to show popular opinion and confirm first person
accounts.
Unfortunately, there is no source or set of sources from which I can gather the
same type of information for each movement to be studied here. Some SMOs have
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infonnation about themselves readily available; other groups are less open. Variable
infonnation sources also exist because some SMOs (such as ACT UP) have been studied
more frequently than others. The lack of a conventional way to gather infonnation about
the three SMOs to be studied here creates the potential for a generalizability problem. To
address this issue, infonnation has been gathered from multiple sources to ensure
reliability and to allow the results here to be applied in other cases. By gathering data
from first person sources, third person analyses, and factual sources this paper will be
able to proceed with the following method.
The dependent variable in this case study is success. There is no agreed upon way
to measure the success of social movement organizations in the literature. The most
commonly used method is to ask if the group is still in existence presently. Some
literature also looks to see if the SMO has declined; if it has this would be a sign that they
are not successful. While this is a good measure of success, I do not believe that it
. captures different levels of Success among SMOs within the same movement or even
from different movements. It also doesn't take into account the changing degrees of
importance that causes may have; if a social movement solves a problem there is no need
for the groups to continue growing and acting. Because of this, I have proposed some
other variables that can be used to detennine the level of success of different groups.
Other proposed criteria for success are listed below. 1) Did the group meet all of
its stated goals? This question will look at stated goals at the time of the group's
fonnation and see if, at present, they have all 'been met. 2) Were there any Supreme
Court decisions or other federal or local court cases which positively affected the
movement's cause? There is a chance that no cases have been tried for some of the
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groups in question so this is not a strong determinant of success on its own. However, for
groups who do get cases heard in court, especially if they are decided in the group's
favor, this is an important determinant of success. 3) Was any legislation passed which
positively affected the movement's cause? This will focus on national legislation but will
look for possible local legislative action when there was none discussed nationally.
Again, there is a chance that some groups were unable to pass legislation related to their
movement at all. But for those who were able to do so, this is a huge factor in success. It
should not be discounted even though it may not apply to everyone. 4) Do any outside
sources attribute positive ch�nge to the success of the group? This is an important
question because it takes into consideration public perceptions of the movement. These
four elements take into consideration some of the key elements of success which an SMO
can experience and allows the variable to be operationalized. It is important to consider
these factors as well as longevity because these can aid in creating a measurement that
can be data driven and include multiple variables.
This case study will use six independent variables to explain the dependent
variable, success. The first independent variable is political context. Context will be
controlled for by studying only one movement in a limited time period. The paper will
study groups within the AIDS Awareness movement and their actions from 1 982 to 1 995 .
These dates were chosen because 1 982 marks the recognition of the AIDS virus and
1 995, according to prominent papers and magazines, marks the "end" of AIDS as an
epidemic (see Appendix). Controlling for context will allow this paper to focus on how
resources and their use determine the success or lack thereof in a group.
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The second independent variable in this study is leadership. Quality of leadership
will be based on the level of professionalism a leader uses. Professional leaders will be
most likely to be successful, nonprofessional leaders will be somewhat likely to be
successful and volunteer leaders will be unlikely to be successful. Professional leaders
have an advantage because they have past experience coordinating action
Organization is the third independent variable. Groups with a formal structure
will be considered most likely to succeed whereas groups with an informal structure will
not be expected to succeed. Formally organized groups have an easier time making
decisions because they have established procedures to do so. Groups will also be more
likely to succeed if they have open communications with chapters, which is related to
organization. The combination of the structure of the group and communication with
separate parts of the group will demonstrate how successful the group is expected to be
based on its organizational structure. Groups that communicate with other members are
able to draw on them for support during periods of action.
The next independent variable is networking. Groups who communicate and
work with other similar groups are more likely to be successful. ,This is similar to
communication within the group, as both encourage involvement during group action,
which is crucial for the group to be noticed by the media, raise funds, and meet other
goals. In terms of joint efforts in contentious actions if the group never works with
similar groups, it will not be likely to succeed . If the group works with like-minded
groups occasionally (at most monthly) or if the group works with these groups more than
once a month, it will be highly likely to succeed.
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The fifth independent variable in this paper is innovation of new tactics. Groups
that are able to use new tactics in contentious action increase their activity level and thus
the chance of success. Innovation also encourages outsiders to pay attention because the
action taking place is interesting; this helps spread awareness about the issues, in this
case, rights for people with AIDS. If a group does not innovate at all, it will not be as
successful as groups that are able to use new forms of contentious action.
The final independent variable here is the use of violence. Groups that participate
in violence, no matter who first used violence, are most likely to succeed. Those groups
which did not use violence but did experience arrests will be likely to succeed as well,
although slightly less so than violent groups. Finally, groups who were not necessarily
violent but were in some way unruly or broke the law but did not use violence or have
any arrests will have a slightly higher success rate. Violence, like innovation, can benefit
groups because 'it brings attention to them. Groups who have not participated in violent
acts have not had a positive impact on their likelihood of success.

The AIDS Awareness Movement

In the Center for Disease Control's 1 98 1 'Weekly Mortality Reports, doctors
began noticing an increasing number of deaths from PCP, a type of pneumonia found
only in people with very weak immune systems. At the time, the reports received little
attention. Within a year, PCP and other diseases that attack those with weak immune
systems were becoming more common, especially in costal cities and among gay men.
The CDC called this the Gay-Related Immune Deficiency (GRID). By May 1 982, GRID
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becomes known as Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). With the
recognition of this new disease came the start of the AIDS Awareness Movement.
The movement emerged during a time of fear, when knowledge about AIDS and
its spread was severely lacking. People feared the AIDS 4-H Club (gays, hemophiliacs,
Haitians, and IV drug users) because in 1983 the CDC said this group had the highest risk
of contracting AIDS. Even though the CDC knew in May 1982 that AIDS was spread
through bodily fluids, people were largely unaware of this and were afraid to even touch
a member of the 4-H Club. People were afraid of being infected, especially since the
disease had no known cure or even treatment. Even by 1984, when more was known
about the disease "[p]olls show 72% of Americans favor mandatory testing; 51% favor
quarantine; and 15% favor tattoos for those infected with HIV" (gmhc.org).
Social movement organizations immediately began to form to address the AIDS
cnSlS. Formation for many was easy because the disease was "disproportionately
prevalent within specific groups, subcultures, and communities" (Epstein 1996, 11). The
main effected group that was able to organize was the gay community. Though at first
m�ny were "sensitive to what seemed like a sardonically homophobic disease" the
community joined together (Jones 2001, 91); they "rejected the traditional approach of
blame, isolation of the sick, and moralism" and chose to focus their effot1s on changing
the "lack of accessible information, bigotry, and poverty" (Siplon 2002, 5). The gay
community was able to use social movement spillover and past experiences working
together to form groups to address the AIDS crisis.
Social movement organizations that formed during this time wanted to address the
public's fear of contracting AIDS. They wanted to educate the public both to stop the
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spread of AIDS and to stop discrimination that was brought on by ignorance. SMOs also
were interested in helping people with AIDS to get medical treatment. Another key goal
was to encourage research for both treatments and a cure for the disease. This response
to AIDS was different than that of the government, which focused on tracking,
identifying, and treating PWAs (Siplon 2002). The government and SMOs debated about
the benefits of focusing on causes rather than treatment (Epstein1995, 1996) as well as
the various prevention strategies (Siplon 2002). Each SMO responded differently to
these key questions, creating different types of groups with different short-term goals, all
focused on the long-term goal of curing AIDS.
I want to pause here to briefly discuss the successes of the AIDS Awareness
movement as a whole. The movement was able to empower patients to become educated
and aware of their options 1• This was a first in the field of health and influenced later
health..;related movements. The movement was able to change public perceptions about
people with AIDS (PWAs) by educating them. In 1985 15% of Americans favored
tattoos for PWAs (gmhc.org); only a few years later, conservative politicians such as
Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush were discussing AIDS in public and using
government funding to find a cure. By 1991, most Americans said that the government
was not doing enough to fight AIDS (gmhc.org) .. Another significant opinion change
occurred in May 1993 when "the Social Services Administration change[d] the disability
regulations for people with HIV, including the addition of a wide range of women
specific opportunistic infections" (actupny.org). This showed an increasing
governmental understanding of problems facing PWAs as well as an acceptance of
women PWAs.
1

This began with the creation of the Denver Principles in 1983 (see Appendix).
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The movement also had legislative and judicial victories at a national level. A
key legislative victory was the Ryan White CARE (Comprehensive AIDS Research
Emergency) Act in 1990 which appropriated $350 million in the first year for disaster
relief to AIDS groups. Overall, the AIDS Awareness movement was very successful in
raising awareness, changing opinions, and getting governmental support for their cause.
The question here is not so much if the groups were successful or not, but what degree of
success they experienced.

ACT UP

During the AIDS Awareness Movement various groups formed to increase
awareness and encourage the government to help AIDS patients by lowering drug costs.
During this time, the only available drug AZT was too expensive for many of the people
who needed it. This was due to "profiteering of pharmaceutical companies, especially
Burroughs Wellcome, manufacturer of AZT" (actupny.org). Frustrated with the lack of
progress in the AIDS awareness movement, the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power (ACT
UP) formed in 1987. The group formed in New York and later chapters sprung up across
the country. "ACT UP ...emerged as a reaction to what the founders perceived as the
government's mismanagement of the AIDS epidemic and the inadequacy of the response
mounted by service-oriented groups" (Halcli 1999, 139). ACT UP activists "do
demonstrations, and act in such a way that the authorities (and in this case we mean
government officials, researchers, politicians, the church and the law) feel is
inappropriate but...[brings] into focus the problems which they are unwilling or afraid to
address" (Greenberg 1992).
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ACT UP faced a relatively negative context. The public was uninformed about
AIDS; oftentimes their lack of support stemmed from fear and a lack of facts. Other
groups in the movement had had no success in changing public opinion. The other major
negative factor that ACT UP had to face was one of its targets, drug companies. Drug
companies had high prices for AZT. They also were slow to put new drugs on the
market, including drugs available in other countries. The government, specifically the
Food and Drug Administration, did not help with this. They had a lot of strict rules on
how and when drugs could be released; they were not sympathetic to the argument that
people were dying while waiting for new drugs to be approved. ACT UP targeted more
than just visible targets; it also "is fighting [an] abstract, disembodied, invisible" target:
power for PWAs (Gamson 1 989, 3 52).
When ACT UP formed, it wrote the group's original goals in its Original Working
Document (see Appendix). The groups had relatively moderate goals in comparison to
other social movement organizations and to its more radical tactics even though the
"media portrayed ACT UP as 'radical,' 'militant,' and even as 'the gay community's
shock troops in the war against AIDS' (Newsweek 1 990)" (Halcli 1 999, 1 45). The top
goal of members was to educate the public about the AIDS virus. Specifically, they'
wanted to inform people about the high drug prices for AZT, the only drug on the market
to fight AIDS. They also wanted to educate people on the possibility to test other drugs
that were available elsewhere. Finally, ACT UP wanted to end insurance discrimination
for people living with AIDS (PWAs). Many PWAs were dropped from their insurance
when they first got a positive diagnosis. Because of this, they were alone to pay the high
costs of drug treatment.
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Despite its negative context, ACT UP was able to keep a consistent number of
active members. About 150 people attended the weekly meetings in New York City
(actupny.org, Epstein 1996). There were also a few thousand activists who regularly
attended protests. Also, many chapters formed around the country, spreading support for
the movement. Membership donations kept the budget high, about $300,000 a year in the
New York chapter by the end of 1988 (actupny.org, Epstein 1996). The one problem that
ACT UP had with support from members was the fluid membership. Many active
members died from AIDS during the movement, making it critical to have lots of
supporters, including many people who could take leadership positions.
To help give every member leadership experience, leadership positions were
elected yearly and were only volunteer positions. There were many different leadership
positions available so that many people could gain experience. "The founders of ACT
UP were firmly committed to creating a nonbureaucratic and participatory SMa" (Halcli
1999, 136). This was beneficial when members began dying because the group would
still have others who could lead the movement.
Although the group had volunteer leaders, it was structured formally and had a
fair amount of communication with chapters. By 1991, there were 113 chapters
worldwide (Halcli 1999, 141). The formal structure of meetings, leadership positions,
and other parts of the organization were outlined in the Original Working Document (see
Appendix). The document, made when the group was first created, structured every
action the group could take. It also discussed the formation of ACT UP chapters.
Chapters did work together on protests but did not communicate frequently because the
Original Working Document said that chapters were to be autonomous. Also, members
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in all chapters were to remain anonymous unless they themselves chose to publicize their
involvement. This, along with frequently changing leaders, made communication with
chapters of the group less frequent.
When ACT UP did form a large event, however, it did work with chapters as well
as similar groups. Not only did ACT UP work with other groups in the AIDS awareness
movement; it also worked with governmental agencies and health organizations.
Frequent communication between groups with similar interests and between ACT UP and
its targets was helpful for the movement to be successful.
To meet its goals, ACT UP used many innovative tactics. "ACT UP mixes
strategic action and material targets with expressive action and cultural targets: their
cultural activity takes the form of boundary-crossing and the contesting of images"
(Gamson 1989, 351). ACT UP is known for its innovative, often controversial, direct
action tactics. As activist Maxine Wolfe said, "Our job is not to be invited to coffee or to
schmooze at a cocktail party. Our job is to make change happen as fast as possible and
direct action works for that" (1997). They used speak outs to inform people about the
suffering of PWAs. In speak outs, anyone affected by AIDS was able to speak in public
(usually on the streets) about the disease. ACT UP was not the first group to use speak
outs, but it did have the first ever woman with AIDS speak on October 2, 1990
(actupny.org). This was important because at the time, AIDS was thought of as a disease
infecting only men.
ACT UP also put its own spin on traditional protest marches, making them like
theatrical performances; the group "became famous for its imaginative street theater, its
skill attracting news cameras, and its well-communicated sense of urgency" (Epstein
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1 995, 220). It turned the marches into a festive occasion (similar to pride parades today)
mixed with strong showings of emotion and anger. The group also used die-ins at these
protests to symbolize the number of PWAs dying while the government did nothing to
help. The die-ins also "give death another meaning by shifting responsibility: these
deaths are likened to murders, victims not of their own 'deviance', but shot down by the
people controlling the definition and enforcement of normality" (Gamson 1 989, 3 6 1 ).
ACT UP even sent some of its members to protest in the New York Stock Exchange on
September 1 4, 1 989. The protesters chained themselves to the balcony of the building to
protest high profits that drug companies made off of AIDS victims.
Another new tactic that ACT UP invented was the zap. The group would pick
one target (the church, a specific politician, etc) and "zap" it by protesting where the
target was located. Sometimes, the protest would be in person, such as the Stop the
Church zaps, whereas others would involve flooding the phone line of a particular group
or person.
Then in 1 992, ACT UP created yet another tactic to remind people of the
devastating effects of AIDS. They began to hold political funerals for members who
requested them. In a political funeral, the recently deceased member would be carried in
the form of ashes or in an open coffin through the streets. The parade-like event would
stop at either a park or the steps of a government building. There, the funeral would
begin. Members would talk about the recently deceased member and how the
government, the public and drug companies failed to act to help this person live. These
political funerals drew huge media attention and sent a very powerful message about the
importance of rapid action to solve the AIDS crisis. One PWA and ACT UP activist
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Mark Lowe Fischer wrote "I want my own political funeral to be fierce and defiant to
make the public statement that my death from AIDS is a form of political assassination"
(actupny.org). Fischer got his wish; he had the first open casket political funeral on
November 2, 1992.
The final new tactic which ACT UP created was DIVA TV. This was a TV show
on the local public television channel. The show was put together to educate people
about the AIDS crisis. In January 1 994 the group expanded its use of public television to
include a weekly call in show called ACT UP LIVE! (ACT UP).
Many of the tactics ACT UP used were new and original to their group. They
often involved radical actions, violence and arrests. ACT UP members were even trained
on how to handle being arrested and to understand why arrest was an important part of
their group's strategy.
Social movement literature would consider this group to be moderately successful
because it is still in existence today. ACT UP NY, the original chapter, still meets
weekly. They collect money and participate in demonstrations. However, while ACT
UP still exists, it has declined. There are fewer chapters in the group and they participate
in demonstrations less often. Even though ACT UP still exists, since it has declined over
time it would be considered less successful than I believe it was during the critical time
period of the AIDS Awareness movement. Despite its decline, ACT UP experienced a
great deal of success from its inception until 1 995. This seems equally important, if not
more important than the long term success of the group; ACT UP was successful during
the key part of the movement when most decisions were made.
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To examine the success of ACT UP during the height of the AIDS Awareness
movement, I will tum to a few other characteristics of the group that show the group was
successful. In terms of meeting its goals, ACT UP was able to inform the public and
change public opinion about PWAs. Activists "found ways of presenting themselves as
credible ... transforming the very definition of what counts as credibility in scientific
research such that their particular assets would prove efficacious" (Epstein 1 995, 409). It
is widely recognized as the first SMO to have this type of impact on the medical
community.
ACT UP was able to get many local legislative changes in New York such as the
New York City Board of Education condom distribution plan. This plan allowed public
school students to receive free condoms in an attempt to stop the spread of AIDS. They
also were responsible for starting a program to distribute clean needles to drug users so
they would not continue to use dirty ones and get infected. Another legislative change
that ACT UP claims responsibility for occurred in May 1 993 when "the Social Services
Administration change[d] the disability regulations for people with HIV, including the
addition of a wide range of women-specific opportunistic infections" (actupny.org). This
showed an increasing governmental understanding of problems facing PWAs as well as
an acceptance of women PWAs.
A key factor that shows the group was successful in many areas is the number of
credible outside sources who attribute success of certain programs to ACT UP. Group
members such as Jon Greenberg considered ACT UP to be successful in changing public
opinion in support of PWAs and the AIDS awareness movement. "[B]ecause of ACT
UP, AIDS and the public perceptions of the disease . ..have been radically transformed"
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(1992). More importantly, though outside sources, including news anchors, agreed with
the group and cited them on several occasions for being the key reason for positive
change. For example, after protesting high prices of AZT at the New York Stock
Exchange in 1990, Newsweek credited ACT UP for getting the drug price lowered:
"when Burroughs Wellcome lowered the price from $8,000 to $6,400 a year, ACT UP's
pressure tactics were . . . credited" (Halcli 1999, 143). ACT UP was credited for another
success after a protest on Wall Street: "when Young [commissioner of the FDA]
announced the establishment of a speedier drug approval process, CBS's Dan Rather
credited ACT UP's pressure tactics for this success" (Halcli 1999, 143). This shows that'
people outside of the group credited ACT UP with various victories in the movement and
recognized them as successful. Because ACT UP was credited by outsiders as causing
positive change, was able to show several characteristics of success during the time
period studied, and continues to exist today, it is considered here to be a successful
movement. However, since it has experienced significant decline, ACT UP is not a
completely successful social movement organization.

The Names Project

The Names Project, best known for creating the AIDS Quilt, began on November
27, 1985 when Cleve Jones first got the idea for making a Quilt to commemorate AIDS
victims. According to his book Stitching a Revolution, Jones was inspired by a
newspaper article discussing the number of people killed by AIDS. Later that night, at a
march to commemorate the murder of Harvey Milk, a gay rights activist and the first
openly gay politician, Jones had participants write the names of dead friends on

29

cardboard squares. Jones and the activists then hung the squares on the Department of
Health and Human Services Office in San Francisco. In February 1987 Jones along with
Joseph Durant, made the first two quilt squares; this marked the beginning of the AIDS
Quilt and, eventually, the social movement organization associated with it, the Names
Project.
Each quilt square was 3x6, about the size of a grave, and made to represent a
person killed by AIDS. Seven quilt squares would be sewn together into a 12x12 square.
Each large square was connected by canvass strips so people could walk around each
larger piece of the quilt. According to Jones, this arrangement made the Quilt "large
enough to be efficient and small enough that people could reach out and touch the fabric
as they walked around them" (Jones 2001, "123). The quilt itself was chosen as a symbol
because "HIV was seen as the product of aggressive gay male sexuality, and it seemed
that the homey image and familial associations of a warm quilt would counter that"
(Jones 2001, 108).
Like ACT UP, the Names Project faced a negative context. In fact the context
" they worked in was almost identical, as they started at the same time, working against the
same public and political perceptions. Since both groups were working against the same
negative public perceptions and lack of political action, context can be controlled for.
Unlike ACT UP, the Names Project had very conservative goals and thus
conservative tactics. The goal of the group was to send "messages of remembrance,
awareness and hope" (aidsquilt.org). Jones and the founder of ACT UP, Larry Kramer,
had very different ideas about the goals and power of the Quilt: according to Jones, the
quilt "symbolizes the power of community- something I've always fought for, something
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�titched into every panel. Larry Kramer stands publicly for separatism, a self-defeating
stance. I've had my share of leading angry crowds against police barricades and
throwing myself against the hard blue line. And it was effective and necessary. But
today's conflicts are not those of fifteen, ten, or even five years ago ...If given a choice, I
choose the strategies less likely to end in blood on the streets" (Jones 200 1 , xiii).
Because of conflicting ideas about the conservative goals and tactics, the leaders of the
group had to work to keep the original message in tact: "To maintain this ...conservative
stance was a constant struggle those first years as we learned over and over that we must
protect the central message" of remembrance and awareness (Jones 200 1 , 1 48).
The leadership of the Names Project consisted of volunteers, most of whom had
been active in the earlier gay right's movement. Because of this, they had past
experience in organizing protests. The group was a non-profit organization as of 1 98 8,
according to the IRS. Volunteers helped to sew the smaller quilt pieces together, traveled
with the quilt to various communities, raised money, and made quilts for the exhibit.
Since the quilt's inception, more than 44,000 panels have been made, over $4,000,000
has been raised in the US alone, and over 1 8,000,000 people have visited the quilt. Many
countries have contributed panels to the quilt and have gotten involved by starting their
own chapters (aidsquilt.org).
Chapters of the Names Project formed as the quilt traveled around the country.

"
After the first display of the quilt on the mall in Washington DC on October 1 1 , 1 98 8,
people from other cities expressed interest in having the quilt displayed locally. "None of
the organizations had much money, and so we [the leaders of the Names Project] offered
the Quilt as the centerpiece for a fund-raiser. In order to finesse the inevitable jockeying
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between groups, we asked that the host committees be made up of a representative from
each local organization. As it turned out, those committees were the embryos of what
became the backbone of the organization: the Quilt chapters" (Jones 2001, 147). The
chapters in each city organized the viewing of the quilt. They were not allowed to charge
for entry to see the quilt, but took donations to raise money for their local groups. They
also accepted more quilt panels to add to the larger quilt. At each display, the leaders of
the group worked to keep the message and keep things simple, although sometimes this
proved to be difficult.
By forming the chapters in this way, the leaders of the Names Project facilitated
communication with similar groups in the AIDS movement and expanded their own
organization and message. This communication connected all different communities and
formed a large voice to speak out and remember AIDS victims. "There was a deep
yearning not only to find a way to give individually and together but also to find a voice
that could be heard beyond our own community, beyond our town" (Jones 2001, 107).
Chapter organization and communication helped to facilitate this goal of creating a single
voice to speak for the AIDS victims.
The desire to give individuals a forum to remember their lost friends and to also
create a unified voice sometimes caused conflict within the group. Individuals who had
made squares felt a sense of ownership which "fought against the Quilt's overreaching
goal, which was to connect all people, regardless of age, race, and sexual orientation, in
the fight against AIDS" (Jones 2001, 126). However, the tactic of making more
individuals a part of and connected to the SMO was beneficial in terms of donations and
support.
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The main tactic used by the Names Project was the creation and presentation of
the quilt. Making a quilt as a memorial to begin with was an innovative tactic; the way
the entire quilt was displayed was perhaps more innovative. The quilt was unfolded by
volunteers dressed in white to symbolize nurses and doctors who helped AIDS patients.
People were allowed to walk around the quilts and touch them, giving them the ability to
interact and be a part of the display. People were also encouraged to participate by
reading names of some of the victims. During the display of the quilt, the names on each
panel were read over a loudspeaker. The people who read names were volunteers, family
or friends who lost loved ones, and celebrities who came to support the cause. Often the
reading was followed by marches or speeches in the evening.
The quilt, being such a new type of tactic for a social movement organization,
attracted a lot of attention. "The response to the first display was overwhelming,
something I [Jones] had not imagined or planned for. I'm convinced that every single
person who saw the Quilt with their own eyes became an evangelist, telling a few friends
who told others, really turning the tide of grassroots support. We were on the front page
of newspapers around the world" (Jones 2001, 136-7). The quilt even was featured in a
documentary Common Threads, which won as Oscar in 1989 for best feature-length
documentary. Books about AIDS, activism, and art have featured the quilt as well. The
use of a quilt in a social movement interested many people, thus bringing media coverage
and attention. The quilt was even nominated for a Nobel Peace Prize in 1989.
Current social movement literature, analyzing the status of the Names Project
today, would say that this SMO has continued to exist and expand. Today, the Names
Project still exists and displays portions of the quilt in communities around the world.
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The quilt has also been a part of World AIDS Day since 1 988. People from around the
world continue to send in panels for the quilt, which can be viewed in its entirety online
(aidsquilt.org). Also, Cleve Jones tours college campuses and communities speaking
about his experience with the quilt and as a PWA. Now the quilt has a broader message
"to emphasize education as a means of dealing with the ongoing epidemic" (Jones 200 1 ,

1 69). The quilt has retained its status as "the largest ongoing community arts project in
the world" (aidsquilt.org). It has not only remained in existence, but continued to grow,
making it a very successful movement.
In terms of the other factors to consider, the Names Project was also successful.
It met its goals of raising awareness and creating a memorial of those who died. It did
not spark legislative or judicial changes, but it did raise awareness among politicians in
Washington DC, including President Clinton, the first president to view the quilt. It also
was able to spread its message to a large public because so many cities were interested in
hosting the quilt as part of a fundraiser for AIDS.
The Names Project was also cited by other people as a success. It was nominated
for a Nobel Peace Prize in 1 989 to recognize the humanitarian work done to fight AIDS.
It also was featured in an academy award winning documentary in 1 989, one of many
appearances of the quilt in the artistic world. Because Project Names was viewed as
successful by outsiders, created positive change during the time period being studied,
exists today, and has continued to grow, it is considered here to be a very successful
social movement organization.
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Gay Men's Health Crisis

In 1981, after the Center for Disease Control began reporting on a rare cancer
seen in homosexual men, "[e]ighty men gather in New York writer Larry Kramer's
apartment to address the ' gay caner' and to raise money for research. This informal
meeting provides the foundation for what will soon become Gay Men's Health Crisis
(GMHC)" (gmhc.org). The organization was officially established in 1982. They were
one of the first SMOs established in response to the AIDS crisis.
The context that GMHC acted in was similar to that of ACT UP and the Names
Project as they were all focusing on AIDS. However, GMHC began before AIDS was
even named (it was called Gay-Related Immune Deficiency until the end of 1982). It was
also formed before the creation of the Denver Principles (see Appendix) which served as
the foundation for AIDS awareness SMOs by focusing on patient empowerment; GMHC
worked to empower patients before this time. Perhaps because it formed a bit earlier it
received the brunt of negativity from the public. However, the public continued to be
unsupportive and suspicious of PWAs later when ACT UP and the Names Project
formed. Ultimately, the context is quite similar because of la,ck of information, public
fear, and little government action.
The main goal of GMHC was to inform and empower AIDS patients. They chose
to publish all available information so that people could make individual choices; early
on they even opposed direct warnings about the link between sex and AIDS2 so that no
individual would be influenced by the group (Siplon 2002). GMHC used an AIDS

2

It is important to note that early on this link was suspected but not confinned. It was not until May 1982

that the CDC discovered that AIDS was spread through bodily fluids.
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hotline and publications to keep people infonned about AIDS. They also raised money
for research and to support PWAs in their day to day needs.
GMHC "had little or no government backing. In spite of this, they'd developed a
support network of over three hundred volunteers to feed, house, and infonn New York's
burgeoning AIDS population" (Jones 2001, 97). They were able to raise $50,000 in 1982
at their first successful fundraiser and continued to raise a large amount of money
(gmhc.org). While relying on volunteers, especially gay men who had connections from
past social movement involvement, the group also had professional leaders. The
organization started with only volunteers, but later hired volunteers to become paid
directors. For the most part though, GMHC relied on volunteers as it was (and still is) a
non-profit organization.
GMHC did not have any chapters because of its focus on caring for PWAs in
New York. The organization had only one office located in the city. However, it helped
PWAs throughout the US by funding research and disseminating important infonnation.
GMHC worked alone rather than working with other groups in the movement or with
ch�pters across the country. This is because the group was focused more on its own local
movement constituency: "Not all social movement organizations are directly concerned
with external challenges, oriented on political powerholders. Organizations may also act
mainly with reference to the needs of social movement constituencies, and/or to support
cultural and symbolic challenges or the practice of a new lifestyle" (Diani and Della Porta
2006, 143). GMHC fits this description, as it focused mainly on providing for the local
community of PWAs. This tactic was a huge benefit for PWAs in the local community,
but did not help those outside of New York, potentially isolating new volunteers.
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The main tactic used by GMHC was the dissemination of infonnation through its
newsletter, its AIDS hotline (the first ever in the world), public conferences, and special
publications. These tactics helped the group in its main goal of infonning PWAs and the
general public. These tactics also were able to reach a broader base than just the GMHC
clients in New York. GMHC also had special programs to assist PWAs who lived in
New York. These programs not only infonned people, but also helped them with day to
day needs. A good example of this is the Buddy Program, established in 1982 to allow
volunteers to assist PWAs.
The other tactics GMHC used were principally to raise funds for the organization
to help local PWAs and to fund research. These included art auctions3 , AIDS walks4, and
dance-a-thons 5 • The dance-&-thons were probably the most innovative technique used by
GMHC and remained popular, even today. The key difference between GMHC's tactics
and those used by other SMOs is that GMHC has a more local focus whereas the groups
studied here are broader, but focus less on helping PWAs locally.
GMHC would be considered a successful group in current social movement
literature because it continues to exist and even grow. Today GMHC still works to help
PWAs in New York as well as to support research. They also keep PWAs infonned
through their website and new online AIDS hotline, along with the phone hotline, making
it easy to access. GMHC continues to have annual AIDS walks in New York to raise
money. In 2005, they were able to raise $5.8 million (gmhc.org). They have also
expanded, recently establishing the Institute for Gay Men's Health and the Women's

3 The first GMHC art auction, held in 1984, raised one million dollars. It was the first AIDS fundraiser in

the world to raise over one million dollars (gmhc.org).
4
5

The first AIDS Wallk in New York in 1986 had over 4,500 participants and raised $7 10,000 (gmhc.org).
The first dance-a-thon, held in 1990, raised over $ 1 million (gmhc.org).
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Institute; they also are focusing on people of color, who are more likely to test positive
for AIDS.
However, during the height of the AIDS Awareness movement (1 982- 1 995),
GMHC was less successful than the above test would show. They were successful in
being the first of many groups to educate and thus empower patients. They were also
successful at fundraising and using money to benefit New York City. Despite this,
GMHC never worked for larger changes such as legal reforms or government spending
programs. They did not participate in the major AIDS programs implemented in the state
of New York or in the country as a whole. Also, they were never directly credited or
acknowledged by the media or other outsiders as directly contributing to the success of
any particular program. Because of this, although GMHC has been successful and
continued to grow, it could have been more successful during the height of the AIDS
Awareness movement.

Conclusion

This paper shows that when controlling for context and subculture, resource
mobilization theory can explain varying degrees of success of social movement
organizations. Based on the current social movement literature, ACT UP and the Names
Project did the best job at using the resources available to them, meaning they were the
most successful SMOs (see Table 1 ). This current success measure seems less useful
though, because it does not account for changes in the movement. For example, ACT UP
has declined but it was very successful during the height of the movement. Success at
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this time seems to be more significant than long-term success. Because this measure
does not seem to be entirely useful for this study, I have combined it with other factors to
address success within a specific time period. Current means of measuring success
(current status of the group, decline of the group) combined with variables I deemed
important (leadership, internal organization, networking, innovation, use of violence, and
attribution of success by outside sources) shows that the Names Project was the most
successful, followed by ACT UP, and GMHC. This measurement is a good way to
explain success of SMOs because it takes into account both current literature and
variables relating to a specific time period of contentious action. This measure takes into
account both the success of the SMO at the height of movement activity as well as the
long-term success of the group, allowing the measurement to be both dynamic and also
narrow in the sense that it is focused on success during a key time in the movement.
Table 1 : Measures of Success

ACT UP

GMHC

Names Project

Current Status

Exists+

Exists+

Exists+

Decay

Yes

No+

Growth+

Other
Characteristics of
Success
Outside Sources

Yes+

Yes+

Some

Yes+

Yes+

No

Overall Success

+++

++++

++

+ Sign of success for the movement
U sing resource mobilization theory allowed close examination of the
characteristics of each group and how each affected success (see Table 2). The results of
using resource mobilization theory demonstrated why some groups are more successful
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than others even when they are working towards the same general goals in the same
movement; these groups had the same context and subculture but experienced different
levels of success. Resource mobilization theory is a useful model to explain varying
success levels when subculture is the same. This model gave insight into which
characteristics mattered more to the level of success of each group, which can show
which variables are more important in the study of success of SMOs.
In terms of leadership, it was expected that professional leaders would have an
edge over volunteers because of their experience organizing. However, this variable did
not seem to have a significant impact on success. Both ACT UP and the Names Project
had volunteer leaders but were still able to be successful. On the other hand, GMHC had
some professional leaders but failed to achieve the same level of success. Also, even
though not all of the groups had professional leaders, they all had some organizing
experience because of the gay rights movement. This demonstrates that perhaps
organizing experience is more important than the type of leadership an SMO has, but
both seem less significant than other factors.
Informal internal organization was also expected to benefit the SMO because they
would be able to be flexible and adapt more easily to change. This turned out to be a
significant advantage for the Names Project. Unlike GMHC and ACT UP, they were
able to adapt their tactics over time. The Names Project changed the way they displayed
the quilt based on feedback from past displays as well as discussion among members.
The flexibility of the organization allowed ideas to be shared openly, tactics to evolve,
and the group to survive and grow in changing environments.
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The use of networking was a tactic that proved to be a great benefit for both ACT
UP and the Names Project. Both groups used their relationships with other SMOs to their
benefit when it came time to rally support for a particular contentious action. The Names
Project was especially successful at networking, using their communication with AIDS
Awareness groups around the country to form their own chapters and to organize events.
This would have greatly benefited GMHC by getting them more support within the
movement. The use of networking was clearly a significant variable in measuring
success.
Like networking, the use of innovative tactics had a significant impact on the
level of success these groups experienced. GMHC was not innovative during its
contentious actions and thus received less attention by the media and the public,
diminishing their ability to raise awareness and to fundraise. ACT UP and the Names
Project, on the other hand, were both recognized for innovative actions. ACT UP was
best known for its innovative and theatrical protests; these got the public, the government
and corporations like Burroughs Wellcome to listen to the message of the group. The .
Names Project was also recognized for the creativity of choosing a quilt as a memorial.
This interested many people, including once again, the media, who featured the quilt in
many news stories. Being innovative got people's attention, which is critical when trying
to inform the public about a problem and to ask for their help in fixing it.
The, use of violence was also significant for ACT UP because like the use of
innovative tactics, it allowed them to get a great deal of attention and media coverage for
their cause. Groups can be successful without using violence (ie. the Names Project) but
it is a good strategic move to use violence, especially if the group or movement is in need
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of media coverage. ACT UP received a great deal of coverage because of their radical,
violent tactics, allowing them to spread their message and ensure that their voices were
being heard. The use of violence also coincided with times when ACT UP was credited
by outside sources for success. While the use of violence may not fit the image that all
SMOs are trying to present (i.e. quilts and violence), it can be a useful tactic if the group
is trying to gain attention for their cause.
Examining individual characteristics of groups shows which strategies were more
important in explaining success among SMOs. This is important for ,future SMOs so that
they can understand specific tactics which are likely to bring them a higher level of
success during the highpoint of contentious action. Groups that are able to be flexible,
network with similar groups, use innovative tactics, and use violence when appropriate
are especially likely to have a high level of success.
Table 2 : Group Characteristics and Success

ACT UP

Names Project

Leadership

Volunteer

Volunteer

Volunteers and
Professional+

Internal Organization

Formal

Informal+

Formal

Networking

Yes+

Yes+

No

Innovation

Yes+

Yes+

No

Use of Violence

Yes+

No

No

Current Status

Exists

Exists

Exists

Decay

Yes

No

No

Other Characteristics of Success

Yes

Yes

Some

Outside Sources

Yes

Yes

No

GMHC

+ Beneficial tactic according to social movement literature
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However, the level of success the group experienced varied based on the measure
used (see Table 3). This demonstrates that changing the way success is measured can
change the outcome of studies of SMOs. This is important to keep in mind for future
research for selecting an appropriate measure of success based on the time period being
studied. Despite outcomes varying slightly based on the choice of a measurement of
success, this paper still shows that resource mobilization theory is able to explain the
success of SMOs both during the height of contentious action and looking at groups long
term success. Ultimately, SMOs can control their level of success by using their
resources strategically.
Table 3 : Comparison of Measures of Success

ACT UP
+
Current Status,
Decay (measure
currently used in the
literature)
++
Other
Characteristics,
Outside Sources
(my measure)
+ Sign of Success for the movement

++

Names Project

++

GMHC

++

Although this paper is not intended to be a comparison between resource
mobilization theory and new movement theory, the results do give some insight into the
benefits of using resource mobilization theory to determine what level of success social
movement organizations experienced. Within the AIDS Awareness movement, activists,
though part of different SMOs with different goals, shared a subculture. Most of the
activists were gay men who were tied together by past actions for gay rights. The
existence of a subculture, in new movement theory, is expected to benefit the SMO and
cause it to be successful. However, this theory does not account for varying degrees of
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success experienced by each group. Despite a shared subculture to draw in participants
and create a sense of solidarity, success among SMOs within the movement varied. This
demonstrates that, while new movement theory may be helpful in explaining success, it
does not explain varying levels of success that can occur within the same movement,
sharing the same subculture.
Some aspects of this paper are limited by a lack of evidence. There is little
concrete information about membership, participation in contentious action, and
fundraising within each group. It seems that this information was only given when a
particular protest was deemed successful; information was not given for failed protest
attempts. This type of evidence could be beneficial, especially in empirical studies of the
SMOs. It could also be helpful in tracking the growth/decline in each SMO.
Another key area where evidence seemed to be less then satisfactory was
newspaper reports on protests and other activities. News media did not cover the AIDS
epidemic much in the beginning; they focused only on what medical evidence was
known, not contentious actions and group formation. They also focused on only the
largest and most innovative protests. For example, ACT UP received a great deal of
coverage for their protests because they were theatrical and entertaining. It would have
been beneficial to have more media reports or accounts from other outside observers
about each contentious action. This would have helped to confirm reports made by the
groups themselves, which could have been biased.
The cases selected here gave insight into comparing success levels within a
movement while controlling for context. The cases represented three prominent groups
in the movement. Cases were all groups made up primarily of gay people; focusing on
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only one member of the 4-B Club6 allowed me to further control for context because the
groups were similar in their past experiences with the gay rights movement and shared
similar subcultures. The cases included a radical group (ACT UP) a moderat� group
(OMBC) and a more conservative group (Names Project). The range of group types
gives leverage because it shows that resource mobilization theory can be applied to
different types of groups. The selection of cases was limited, however, by a lack of
information about other smaller groups within the AIDS movement, including groups
dominated by minorities. Many other SMOs existed, but have not been studied or written
about much because of their size and lack of long-term success. Despite a limited
number of cases to choose from, the available cases represented a range of SMO types.
Even with a small case number, the range of cases allows this paper to be applied to
future social movement studies.
Future research in this area should work to find an appropriate measure of success
that can be transferred into an empirical study. When considering measures of success, it
would be important to determine the salience of the issue; this would determine if the
current status or decay of the group are useful indicators to include. It would also be
important to consider other measures of success, such as legislative changes, which are
impo�ant in political science. These also show that the group had a lasting and
significant impact, at least for the time that the legislation was in use. A concrete
measurement of success would also aid in future studies testing the reliability of resource
mobilization theory and comparing it to new movement theory. This is another important
step in the social movement literature.

6

Recall that the 4-H Club is made up of gay men, Haitians, hemophiliacs and IV drug users.
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Appendix
AIDS Timeline
•

•

•

•

•

•

•
•

•
•

•
•
•

•
•
•

•

•

•
•

•
•

1981: CDC's Mortality and Morbidity Weekly Report mentions deaths from PCP
which occurs in people with weak immune systems. They also notice Kaposi's
sarcoma, a rare cancer, occurring in many gay men. The cancer is also reported in
The New York Times story "Rare Cancer Seen in 41 Homosexuals"
1982: The new disease called Gay-Related Immune Deficiency. It is declared to
be an epidemic by the CDC.
1982: Nathan Fain, Larry Kramer, Larry Mass, Paul Popham, Paul Rapoport and
Edmund White establish GMHC.
May 1982: The disease is now called AIDS. The CDC knows that it is spread
through fluids but does not know the cause.
1983: CDC says homosexual men, IV drug users, Haitian immigrants and
hemophiliacs had an increased risk of disease (AIDS 4-H Club)
1983: At the AIDS forum in Denver the Denver Principles are created, which are
a basis for the movement, "articulating the self-empowerment and rights of
PWAs" (GMHC)
1984: Time magazine calls San Francisco "Ground Zero of the Plague" (Jones 99)
1984: Dr. Luc Montagnier in France and Dr. Robert Gallow in the US isolate HIV
and discover that it is the cause of AIDS
1985: Phase I of AZT trial testing begins.
1985: "Polls show that '72% of Americans favor mandatory testing; 51% favor
quarantine; and 15% favor tattoos for those infected with HIV" (GMHC)
1985: The death of Rock Hudson brings more media coverage to the epidemic.
1986: Phase II of AZT trials begin.
1986: The Department of Justice rules that PWAs or people who may have the
virus can be fired legally. Some states pass bills banning PWAs from working in
education or food services. Other states make it a crime to transmit HIV.
1986: HIV is officially named as virus causing AIDS.
1987: ACT UP is created (see Working Document in Appendix)
3/19/87: AZT appears on the market for $10,000 for a year's supply. ACT UP
protests the 4igh price on Wall Street.
10/11187: National March for Gay and Lesbian Rights has the first display of the
AIDS Quilt, hanging in San Francisco city hall. Later that year it is displayed on
the national mall.
10/14/87: Jesse Helmes starts debate in the Senate supporting HIV prevention via
abstinence in response to a comic book by GMHC.
1987: Ronald Regan uses the word "AIDS" in public for the first time.
1988: ACT UP and other groups close the FDA during their demonstrations to
advocate for changes in testing and approval of treatment for AIDS. "The event
receives international press coverage" (ACT UP).
1988: More media coverage on AIDS such as a Newsweek cover featuring PWAs
1988: Surgeon General Koop mails a brochure "Understanding AIDS" to every
American household.
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•
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1989: ACT UP protests on Wall Street again in response to high costs of AZT.
Burroughs Wellcome (the pharmaceutical company) responds by lowering the
price to $6,400 per year, a 20% decrease.
1990: The Ryan White CARE (Comprehensive AIDS Resource Emergency) Act,
a bill sending disaster relief to AIDS groups, is passed after Ryan White, a 19
year old AIDS activist, dies. $350 million out of the total $881 million is
appropriated.
1990: President Bush signs the Americans with Disabilities Act to protect people
with disabilities, including people with AIDS, from discrimination.
1990: Common Threads, a documentary about the AIDS Quilt and 5 PWAs, wins
an Oscar.
July 1990: " Women, AIDS & Activism, developed originally by ACT UP's
Women's Caucus in 1989, is published. It is the first book to chart the natural
history of AIDS in women" (ACT UP). Later in the year the first National
Women and HIV Conference is held.
1991: Magic Johnson is the first major celebrity to announce that he is HIV
positive.
1991: "A Roper poll commissioned by GMHC finds that a majority of Americans
believe that the federal government is not doing enough to fight AIDS. and that
explicit AIDS education is needed" (GMHC).
1992: "After five years of litigation, led by GMHC, the American Civil Liberties
Union (ACLU), and others, a federal court strikes down 'offensiveness'
restrictions on AIDS education materials proposed by Senator Jesse Helms"
(GMHC).
1992: The final display of the entire AIDS Quilt takes place on the mall.
President Clinton becomes the first President to visit the Quilt. At the same time,
ACT UP held- its first political funeral, scattering ashes of PWAs on the White
House lawn.
1993: European Concorde study shows doubts about functionality of AZT in
fighting AIDS.
April 24 and 25, 1993: March on Washington for gay and lesbian rights.
1995: Drug cocktails, a mix of multiple drugs begin to be used to treat AIDS.
1996: "Cover stories hailing AIDS breakthroughs and the 'end' of the epidemic
appear in The New York Times Magazine, The Wall Street Journal, and
Newsweek" (GMHC).
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THE DENVER PRINCIPLES

Source: ACT UP NY

We condemn attempts to label us as "victims," a term which implies defeat, and we are
only occasionally "patients," a term which implies passivity, helplessness, and
dependence upon the care of others. We are "People With AIDS."
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ALL PEOPLE
1 . Support us in our struggle against those who would fire us from our jobs, evict us from
our homes, refuse to touch us or separate us from our loved ones, our community or our
peers, since available evidence does not support the view that AIDS can be spread by
casual, social contact.

2. Not scapegoat people with AIDS, blame us for the epidemic or generalize about our
lifestyles.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR PEOPLE WITH AIDS
1 . Form caucuses to choose their own representatives, to deal with the media, to choose
their own agenda and to plan their own strategies.

2. Be involved at every level of decision-making and specifically serve on the boards of
directors of provider organizations.
3 . Be included in all AIDS forums with equal credibility as other participants, to share
their own experiences and knowledge.
4. Substitute low-risk sexual behaviors for those which could endanger themselves or
their partners; we feel people with AIDS have an ethical responsibility to inform their
potential sexual partners of their health status.
RIGHTS OF PEOPLE WITH AIDS
1 . To as full and satisfying sexual and emotional lives as anyone else.

2. To quality medical treatment and quality social service provision without
discrimination of any form including sexual orientation, gender, diagnosis, economic
status or race.
3 . To full explanations of all medical procedures and risks, to choose or refuse their
treatment modalities, to refuse to participate in research without jeopardizing their
treatment and to make informed decisions about their lives.
4. To privacy, to confidentiality -of medical records, to human respect and to choose who
their significant others are.
5 . To die--and to LIVE--in dignity.
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ACT UP Original Working Document (1987)

Source: actupny.org

Proposal to Create a Coordinating Committee
Purpose
To create a coordinating committee which would streamline the administrative
functioning of ACT UP without usurping the power and energy residing in the body as a
whole.

Why we Need a Coordinating Committee?
In the weeks since its creation, ACT UP has had considerable victories. We have focused
the media's attention on the drug development bottleneck which exists within our
government and on the greed of Burroughs Wellcome. We have shown governmental
agencies that we are watching: they will be held accountable. And we have brought new
energy and hope to the lesbian/gay community.
We can do much, much more. With planning, we'll have 600 angry people at our next
demonstration, not 300. and the demonstration after that will have 1200 people. As our
numbers grow, our power will grow. We can continue to shed light on the drug situation
and bring new insight to AIDS education, insurance discrimination, and other aspects of
the AIDS crisis.
But to accomplish these goals - to continue to grow - we need more structure. We need to
know who is authorized to make decisions in a crisis, who can spend money between
meetings. And we need to ensure, on a day to day basis, that fundraising, outreach,
publicity and other increasingly important tasks are handled consistently.
Each of us became involved with ACT UP because of frustration and anger with the U.S.
governm�nt and its lack of interest and leadership in the AIDS crisis. We can't afford to
squander the energy we've developed. But we will if we allow ourselves to become
bogged down by details at weekly meetings. We need to trust ourselves enough to give
up some administrative authority to permanent standing committees which will be better
equipped to handle these details.
Let's spend our valuable meeting time on the most crucial items: our issues and the
demonstrations through which we present them.

Who will be on the coordinating committee?
The committee will consist of the following people:
A. One representative of the following five committees. Each committee will select its
own representative to the coordinating committee. Alternates should also be selected to
attend coordinating . committee meetings if the regular representative can't attend.
Outreach: committee works on increasing the diversity of our organization involving
people of color, women, and others affected by AIDS. Ensures that these groups'
concerns are discussed at meetings.
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Logistics: committee publicize demos, interacts with police and works with outreach
committee to ensure that demos are attended by all interested parties. Activates the phone
tree.
Issues: committee researches and reviews our demands. keeps in contact with health care
providers and policy makers to keep abreast of new developments.
Media: committee ensures consistent and accurate coverage of our events.
Fundraising: committee coordinates all fundraising activities.

B. The following four people would be selected by the group as a whole:
Secretary: keeps the minutes. makes sure our phone and mailing lists are up to date.
Serves as historian.
Treasurer: Keeps all financial information. Signs checks.
At-Large members: two others selected by the group. These two should be people we
want involved in the decision making, but who are not representatives of any committee.
How will the committee work?
The committee would meet as frequently as need to ensure that all necessary work is
being completed. Meetings would probably happen on a weekly basis. the coordinating
committee would work by consensus. Issues that the committee can't come to consensus
on would be decided by ACT UP as a whole. Of course, all coordinating committee
meetings would be open to all.
What are some of the specific things the committee would do?
Examples of what the committee might do are:
A. Expense authorization. Okays expenses between meetings.
B. Review Literature: Flyers, posters, and other publicity items would be read by the
committee to ensure that our message is presented strongly and clearly.
C. Coordinate committees: Ensure that committees are not repeating each other's work.
A�ts as a resource if a committee needs additional input. Ensures that committees are
functioning and helps to recruit new members if a committee needs more.
D. Plan agendas: Plans the agendas for general meetings, ensuring that all our business is
given time to be discussed. Also ensures that there is time fo new business.

Terms of office
Representatives of the five committees stay on the coordinating committee for as long as
the committee they represent wishes. It is suggested that responsibility be shared,
however, to involve as many people as possible and to avoid burnout.
The two At-Large members, secretary and treasurer are elected for six month terms. If a
vacancy arises in one of these four spots, the body as a whole shall elect a new member.
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